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Notes
Discrimination In the Laws
of Information Warfare
As societies and economies increasingly rely on electronic
telecommunications,they grow more vulnerable to threatsfrom
other computer systems. At the same time, states' military and
intelligence organizations are increasingly developing the
capability to attack and defend these assets. As with the
introduction of earlier weapons systems, would-be users
express the belief that the laws restraining warjare no longer
apply. This Note seeks to explain the emerging relationship
between electronic telecommunicationsand the laws of war. In
particular, this Note seeks to show how the norm requiring the
discrimination between military and civilian objectives may be
retained in an era of long-distance wagare. Finally, itpresents
a model protocol to guide warriors and lawyers in planning or
judging the legitimacy of information operations.

War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will . . . .
Attached toforce are certain self-imposed, imperceptible limitations hardly
worth mentioning, known as international law and custom, but they scarcely
weaken it.2
-Carl von Clausewitz

1. In 1995-1996, I served as aprofessorat the AirWar College, United States AirForce's
senior service school. However, this Note is not directly informed by any classified
information, nor does it represent anyone's opinions but my own.
CLAUSEWITZ,
ON WAR75 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret eds. & transs.,
2. CARLVON
1976) (1832). Likewise, centuries before, Cicero claimed that inter arma silent leges (in war
the law is silent).
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War consists largely of acts that would be criminal ifperjormed in time of
peace-killing, woundirrg, kidnapping, destroying o r carrying off other
peoples 'property. Such conduct is not regarded as criminal ifit takes place
in the course of war, because the state of war lays a blanket of immunity
over the warriors. But the area of immunity is not unlimited, and its
boundaries are marked b y the laws of war.3
-Telford Taylor

As Telford Taylor noted, the laws of war distinguish soldiers,
sailors, marines, airmen, and even spies from murderers, kidnappers,
and arsonists. The distinction Taylor describes is inextricable from
legal notions of war, a conclusion down-played or possibly
misconstrued by strategist Carl von Clausewitz in the cited excerpt from
his seminal treatise, On War? In reality, the laws of war have long
restrained its legitimate conduct. These constraints include distinctions
between campaign and non-campaign seasons: and they guide "the
selection of methods, of weaponry and of target^."^ They provide
specific immunities for certain persons and places. They distinguish
between combatants and noncombatants, between legitimate and
illegitimate target^.^ Over the millennia and particularly the past halfcentury, these rules have expanded and been codified in international
law. Despite these remarkable advances, discrimination between
legitimate and illegitimate weapons, methods, and targets has also
eroded over the past half-century, as warfare expanded from limited setpiece encounters into virtually unlimited wars between multi-state
alliances.* Even so, this critical norm of humanitarian law has survived.
As the laws improved, the breaches became more stark.
3. TELFORD TAYLOR,NUREMBERG
AND VIETNAM:
AN AMERICAN
TRAGEDY 19 (1970).
OFWAR:CONSTRAINTS
ON WARFARE
4. See Michael Howard, Introduction ~OTHELAWS
IN THE WESTERN
WORLD2 (Michael Howard et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter LAWSOF WAR].
While the formal laws of war were less developed in the Napoleonic era than they are today,
Howard notes that Clausewitz "knew very well . . . that the conduct of war was subject to
considerably greater and more perceptible limitations in his own time than it had been in the
days of, say, Genghis Khan." Id.
5. Josiah Ober, Classical Greek Times, in LAWSOF WAR, supra note 4, at 13-26.
ON THE LAWSOF WAR 5 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 2d ed.
6. DOCUMENTS
1989) [hereinafter Roberts & Guela.
7 . For an introduction to the notion of the immunity of non-combatants, see Howard,
Constraints on Walfare, in LAWSOF WAR,supra note 4, at 3-1 1. Examples of this principle
abound in history. See Robert Stacey, Age of Chivalry, in LAWSOF WAR,supra note 4, at 293 1; Geoffrey Parker, Early Modem Europe, in LAWSOF WAR,supra note 4, at 41,46; Gunther
Rothenberg, The Age of Napoleon, in LAWSOF WAR,supra note 4, at 87-97.
8. For a description and analysis of the most horrifying example of the expansion of war,
see David Alan Rosenberg, Nuclear WarPlanning, in LAWSOF WAR,supra note 4, at 160; see
also David Alan Rosenberg, The Originsof Overkill: Nuclear WeaponsandAmericanStrategy,
1945-1960,7 INT'LSECUWY(Spring 1983) at 3-71.
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This Note analyzes some of the problems and suggests some
guidelines for retaining the critical norm of discrimination in the era of
long-distance, impersonal, and undeclared war in the information age.
Part I introduces discrimination-the long-standing norm requiring that
military planners and operators distinguish between legitimate military
objectives and non-combatants. Part II grapples with the fast-changing
subject of warfare in the information age. Part III tackles the problems
of applying discrimination today. Discrimination faces many new
challenges, but the traditional means for formulating solutions still offer
valuable tools for finding legal and ethical constraints on the application
of force via electronic media. Part IV provides a model protocol that
acknowledges these international norms, formalizing them in
international law. Finally, Part V offers a few concluding remarks.
While states frequently engage in armed conflict: aggressive
international war has been outlawed-f~st by the Kellogg-Briand Treaty
(1928)1° and more efficaciously by the UN Charter (1945)."
Nonetheless, "[tlhe application of the laws of war does not depend upon
the recognition of the existence of a formal state of 'war,' but (with
certain qualifications) comprehends situations of armed conflict and
military occupation in general, whether formally recognized as 'war' or
not."12
Thus the tradition of the laws of war has evolved into the law of
armed conflict (LOAC).13 Moreover, because the laws limiting a state's
9. Themost interestinginquiry into theend of formal warmay ~~MARTINVANCREVELD,
TRANSFORMATION OF WAR (1991). See also Paul Kennedy & George J. Andreopoulos, The
Laws of War: Some Concluding Reflections, in LAWSOF WAR,supra note 4, at 214-25.
10. General Treaty For the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy
("Kellogg-Briand Pact"), Aug. 27, 1928, T.S. No. 796.
11. U.N. CHARTERarts. 2(4) ("All members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."), 51
("Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective selfdefense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations . .. .").
12. Roberts & Guelff, supra note 6, at 1.
13. For the transition from laws of war to LOAC, see Lt. Col. Marc L. Warren,
Operational Law-A Concept Matures, 152 MIL.L. REV. 33,35 (1996) ("Military operations
other than war present numerous and diverse legal issues."). The U.S. codification of LOAC
began with the field manual Columbia Law School professor Francis Lieber wrote for the Union
Army during the Civil War. See U.S. Army General Order No. 100, Instructions for the
Government of Armies of the United States in the Field (1863) (addressing legal issues about
the treatment of the enemy without a declaration of war), available in THE AVALONPROJECT
AT THE YALE LAW SCHOOL: DOCUMENTSIN LAW, HISTORY, AND DIPLOMACY,
<http:l/www.yale.eduflawweblavalon/lieber.ht [hereinafter Lieber Code]. See LAWSOF
WAR, supra note 4, at 6. General Order No. 100 has undergone significant revisions but
remains the basic Field Manual of the U.S. Army. See Lieber Code, supra, at 100-05.
"Although such national manuals also have a function in providing evidence of the law, they
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entry into hostility are now governed by a variety of international laws
that have replaced the just war tradition (jus ad bellum), this Note will
concentrate on the jus in bello-restraints on the conduct of warfare.14

II. INFORMATION
WARFARE
One of the most dynamic types of "armed conflict" is Information
Warfare ("IW).15 Ironically, IW is neither 'armed' in the traditional
sense, nor does it necessarily involve 'conflict.' Dramatic hypothetical
accounts of IW abound and best serve to introduce this apparent
paradox. Consider a few hypothetical situations. Special forces
detonate a small non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse weapon (EMP) near
an enemy nation's central bank computer storage facility, burning out
the electronics that transact, communicate, and store the nation's
financial information. Or, an intelligence operator hacks from his own
country into another nation's telecommunications network, planting
computer code that destroys the software running that system. Or, a
military operator feeds into another state's television broadcast
"morphed" images of that state's religious leader engaged in
sacrilegious acts. Or, another operator hacks into a target nation's
computer network coordinating air or rail traffic to reprogram the
systems to shut down without warning.16 At the extreme, each of these
hypothetical situations would lead to dramatic results: economies

are in general bound to be viewed with some caution." Roberts & Guelff, supra note 6, at 7.
Today, the applicable law might preferably be called "international humanitarian law
applicable in armed conflicts" or "Operational Law." For the former term, see International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference on the
Reafirmation and Development of International Humanitarian h w Applicable in Armed
ConjZict (1977). The ICRC was founded at the 1863 Geneva International Conference "with
the express purpose of reducing the horror of warfare." Roberts & Guelff, supra note 6, at 8.
For the latter term, "Operational Law," seeLt. Col. David E. Graham, Operationalhw:
A Concept Comes ofAge, ARMYLAW., July 1987, at 9 ("that body of law, both domestic and
international, impacting upon legal issues associated with the planning for and deployment of
US Forces overseas in both peacetime and combat environments."); see also Warren, supra, at
36.
14. Roberts and Guelff note the "cardinal principle that jus in bello applies in cases of
armed conflict whether the conflict is lawful or unlawful in its inception underjus ad bellum."
Roberts & Guelff, supra note 6, at 1.
15. Douglas Waller, Onward Cyber Soldiers, TIME, Aug. 21, 1995, at 39 ('"information
warfare'-now the hottest concept in the halls of the Pentagon").
16. These hypothetical situations are based directly on those in Waller, supra note 15,3944. See also Lt. Col. Kurt C. Reitinger, New Toolsfor New Jobs, 124 PROC.U.S. NAVALINST.
37 (Apr. 1998) (discussing the need for new doctrine to successfully employ new non-lethal
military technology). See also Elaine Scany, The Fall of W A 800: The Possibility of
Electromagnetic Zntetjerence, N. Y . REV.BOOKS,Apr. 9, 1998.
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would be destroyed; societies would disintegrate; planes and trains
would crash. As a result, governments might fall. Thousands of people
would likely perish. As dramatic as these hypotheticals are, IW may
prove complicated and possibly even more devastating than these
examples suggest.17 If subtle or carefully played, attacks might go
undetected, and the target countries or organizations would not even
know to protect themselves against follow-on attacks. For example, an
air-traffic controller would wonder why his system crashed at such an
inopportune moment. A banker would wonder about a million dollar
discrepancy in a large transaction. IW7spotential impact ranges from
the cataclysmic to the trivial. And yet, we have only begun to consider
what it is and how it may be pursued.
Definitions of this fast-changing and mostly classified set of
capabilities and operations-IW-vary.
Each of the U.S. military
services is currently engaged in studying IW. Each has considerable
experience and expertise in information operations of one variety or
another.18 While their definitions do not vary significantly, this Note
adopts that of the Air Force (USAF), which appears to be the lead
agency. IW is any "action to deny, exploit, corrupt, or destroy the
enemy's information and its functions; protecting ourselves against

17. For context on jus ad bellum Gust war theory], see MICHAEL
WALZER,JUSTAND
UNJUST
WARS,pt. 2, at 51-124 (1977). The most critical and difficultjus ad bellum issues for
IW include: ljproblems of proof when a party suspects an informatio&sault; and 2) deciding
when such an assault attains the level of an "armed attack" as required under U.N. CHARTER
art.
51, or "aggression" as defined by the U.N. General ~ssembly,-G.A.Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N.
GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, art. 1, U.N. Doc. 119631 (1974). For a start, see George I.
Seffers & Mark Walsh, Does a Cyber Attack Constitute War?, DEFENSENEWS,
Sept. 8,1997,
at 1.
A recent article does address some of the larger international legal implications. See
Sean P. Kanuck, Information Warfare:New Challengesforpublic International Law, 37 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 272 (1996) (arguing that successful resolution of international conflicts in the
information age will require a new theoretical structure of law).
18. For instance, the U.S. Army has long had the standing capability to engage in
psychological operations such as those relying on broadcast reports or distributingpamphlets
to encourage an enemy to retire from the field. See Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Gordon R.
Sullivan & Col. James M. Dubik, War in the Information Age, 74 M I L REV.46 (July 1993),
reprinted in 94-4 LANDPOWER ESSAYSSERIES(May, 1994). The Navy also has considerable
expertise. See Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski &John J. Gartska,Network-Centric Warfare:
Its Origin and Future, 124 PROC.U.S. NAVALINST.88 (Jan. 1998). The Air Force has an
Information Warfare squadron at Shaw AFB, North Carolina. See Col Phillip A. Johnson,
USAF, Associate Deputy General Counsel (IA), Office of the General Counsel, DOD, in
Opening Shots: Information Warfare and the Law, brief to FY 98, US Air Force Judge
AdvocateGeneral School,Legal Aspects of Information Operations Symposium,Maxwell AFB,
Ala., app. F,Principal DoD Information Warfare Organizations, at F-33-34. The USAF also
has an Information Warfare Center at Kelly, AFB, Texas. Information superiority is an official
Air Force core competency, alongside such traditional concerns as rapid global mobility and
precision engagement.
See Global Engagement (visited Mar. 8, 1999)
<www.af.miVcurrent/globaV>.
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those actions; and exploiting our own military information function^."'^
It includes electronic warfare, military deception, physical destruction,
security measures, and information attack.20 The Air Force defines
information in this context as "data and instructions" and distinguishes
IW from warfare in the information age generally, including in the
former only those attempts to influence the information dire~tly.~'In

19. DEP'T OF THE AIRFORCE
(USAF), CORNERSTONES
OF INFORMATION WARFARE
3-4
(1995) [hereinafter CORNERSTONES]. See also OFFICE OF THE CHIEFOF NAVALOPERATIONS,
DEP'TOFTHENAVY,OPNAVINST 3430.26, at 1 (Jan. 18., 1995) ("Information warfare is the
action taken in support of national security strategy to seize and maintain a decisive advantage
by attacking an adversary's information infrastructure through exploitation, denial, and
influence, while protecting friendly information systems.").
The literature on IW is small but growing and includes: THEINFORMATIONREVOLUTION
AND NATIONALSECURITY (Stuart J.D. Schwartzstein ed., 1996); WINN SCHWARTAU,
INFORMATION WARFARE:CHAOSON THE ELECTRONICSUPERHIGHWAY (1994); NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL(NRC)'S SYSTEMSECURITY COMMITTEE,COMPUTERS
AT RISK: SAFE
COMPUTINGINTHEINFORMATIONAGE
(1991); THEFIRSTINFORMATION
WAR(Alan D. Campen
ed., 1992); MANUELDELANDA,
WARINTHEAGEOFINTELLIGENTMACHINES
(1991); KENNETH
COMMAND,
CONTROL,
ANDTHE COMMONDEFENSE
(1996); PAULSTRASSMANN,THE
C. ALLARD,
POLITICSOFINFORMATIONMANAGEMENT
(1995); MARTINC. LIBICKI,THEMESHANDTHENET:
SPECULATIONSON ARMED CONFLICTIN A m E O F m E SILICON (1995); DAVIDF. RONFELDT,
CYBEROCRACY,
CYBERSPACE,
AND CYBEROLOGY:
POLITICALEFFECTSOF THE INFORMATION
REVOLUTION(1991); GERALDHUST, TAKING DOWN TELECOMMUNICATIONS (1994);
BATTLEFIELDOF THE FUTURE: 21ST CENTURYWARFAREISSUES (Bany R. Schneider &
Lawrence E. Grinter eds., 1995); MARTINC.LIBI~KI,
WHATISINFORMATION
WARFARE(1995).
The periodical literatureincludes: John Arquilla &DavidRonfeldt, Cybenvaris Coming,
12COMP.STRATEGY
141 (Apr.-June 1993); Martin C. Libicki &James A. Hazlett, Do WeNeed
an Information Corps?, JOINTFORCEQ.(Autumn 1993); P.C. Emmett, Sofhvare Warfare: The
INST.J. @ec. 1992); Mary Fitzgerald, Russian
Emerging Future, ROYAL UNITEDSERVICES
J. (Spring-Summer
Views of Electronic Signals and Information Warfare, AM. INTELLIGENCE
1994); John Rothrock, Information Warfare: Time for some Constructive Skepticism, AM.
INTELLIGENCEJ.
(Spring-Summer 1994); Craig Johnson, Information War-Not a Paper War,
J. ELECTRONICDEF.
(Aug. 1994); Chet Morris et al., WeaponsofMass Protection: Nonlethality,
Information, Warfare, and Airpower in the Age of Chaos, in AIRPOWERJ. (Spring 1995);
George J. Stein, Information Warfare, in AIRPOWERJ. (Spring 1995); Richard Szafranski, A
Theory ofInformation Warfare: Preparing for2020, in AIRPoWERJ. 77 (Spring 1995);Richard
Szafranski, When Waves Collide: Future Conflict, JOINT FORCEQ. (Spring 1995); Jim
Anderson, Chugging up the Onramp of the Info Interstate, FOR.SERVICEJ. (Mar. 1995);
Defense Technology, ECONOMIST,
June 10,1995, supp. 5-20; Donald E. Ryan, Implications of
Information-Based Wagare, JOINT FORCE Q. (Autumn-Winter 1994-95); H.D. Arnold et al.,
Targeting Financial Systems as Centers of Gravity: 'Low Intensity' to 'No Intensity' Conflict,
10 DEE ANALYSIS(1994); Spacecast 2020, Leveraging the Infosphere: Surveillance and
J. (Summer 1995).
Reconnaissance in 2020, AIRPOWER
20. The USAF defines information attack as "[d]irectly corrupting information without
visibly changing the physical entity within which it resides." CORNERSTONES,
supra note 19,
at 6.
21. The information age is most famously explained by theTofflers. See ALVINTOFFLER
& HEIDITOFFLER,
WARAND ANTI-WAR:SURVIVALATTHEDAWN
OFTHE21ST CENTURY (1993)
(the emergingknowledge-based society will useknowledge-based systems to conduct warfare).
See also Mark R. Shulman, War and Anti-War, 121 PROC.U.S. NAVALINST.
84 (Oct. 1994)
(book review).
For an overview of information superiority, see Cebrowski & Gartska, supra note 18, at
28-35; and Col. Owen D. Ryan &John J. Gartska, The Emerging Joint StrategyforInfonnation
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addition to being defined, IW also needs to be placed within the broader
context of military operations.
IW operations potentially range across the entire spectrum of
military capabilities. The traditional state-sponsored uses of force
define the categories of conflict. Because the international system has
effectively outlawed aggressive war, most cross-border conflicts are
styled "self-defense" or "defen~ive."~~
At the most basic level, I
distinguish between a military operation based on an "offensive
defense" and one based on a "defensive defense."23 For example, the
defensive can be offensive, as it was when the Allied Forces landed at
Normandy in 1944 or in Kuwait and Iraq in 1991.24 These are offensive
measures undertaken in collective self-defense. The defense was
defensive when the Anglo-French forces attempted to keep the
Wehrmacht from pushing them out of France in 1940 or when the UN
Forces sent USAF F-15s to Saudi Arabia fifty years later to deter the
Iraqi invasion. Strictly defensive or security operations include camp or
perimeter defenses like sentries firing sidearms when they detect a
perimeter breach.
In IW, these distinctions also apply. Offensive defense IW
operations might include: 1) active collection of intelligence about

Superiority, US DOD, Joint Staff J-6, information briefing (visited Mar. 4, 1999)

<http:llwww.dtic.mil/JCSlJ61eduUtr.html>.
22. U.N. CHARTERart. 51 (nothing "shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense").
23. Throughout most of the nineteenth century, coastal defense boats and fortresses
provided the United States with defensive defense. As they evolved in the 1880s and 1890s,
battleships provided a new offensive defense, defending the nation instead by threatening to
bring the battle to the enemy. Strictly defensive measures were never abandoned; if a spy
attempted to destroy a naval vessel in a U.S. harbor, he would have been arrested or killed. See
MARK
RUSSELL
SHULMAN,
NAVALISM
AND THE EMERGENCE
OFAMERICAN SEAPOWER,18821893, at 1-2 (1995). For a graphic explanation of these types of warfare, see id.; see also infra,
Appendix 11.
24. There are potential military applications for information operations that are neither
offensive nor defensive. Consider, for instance, the use of radio jamming when Hutu extremists
are broadcasting "lists of enemies to be hunted down and butchered." Jamie Frederic Metzl,
InformationIntervention, FOREIGNAFF.15-20 (Nov.lDec. 1997). Formore extensivetreatment,
see also Jamie Frederic Metzl, Rwandan Genocide and the International Law of Radio
Jamming, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 628 (1997) (proposing "a narrow exception to the general
international standard supporting the free flow of information . ..for clear cases of incitement
to genocide where the occurrence of that genocide appears imminent" or for cases of mass
ON
human rights abuse). For a comprehensive program, see CARNEGIECOMMISSION
P R E V E ~DEADLY
G
CONFLICT,
~ A L R E P O RPREVENTING
T:
DEADLY
C O W C T(1997). See
also Warren, supra note 13, at 34-37; Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War,
Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 3-07 (1995) (visited Mar. 24, 1999)
~www.dtic.mil/doctrineJjeYC_pubs2.htm.
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information systems;25 2) unauthorized intrusions into information
systems; 3) introduction of vulnerabilities into information systems; 4)
corruption or denial of data; and 5) disabling or destroying information
systems.26These are sometimesreferred to as "information operations."
United States law requires that the armed forces and intelligence
services of the United States undertake this type of operation only
against particular foreign opponents under executive order, presumably
as part of a coordinated national policy to implement unilateral or
multilateral defensive operation^.^^
The legal issues of offensive information operations have never
been brought before U.S. courts. The military and intelligenceagencies,
however, would likely be authorized to undertake them when ordered
by the Executive. This law has not yet been pled or decided, but it
seems like a small step from traditional forms of covert action to the
types of net-centric IW considered in this Note.2s The Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Department of Defense (DOD) are
granted general authority to undertake covert action at the direction of
the National Security Council.29 The breadth of this authority was
clarified by Executive Order No. 12,333, which provides in part:
No agency except the CIA (or the Armed Forces of the United
States in time of war declared by Congress or during any period
25. Active collection includes such measures as infiltrating another country's computer
systems, either by sitting down in front of its dedicated terminals or via telecommunications
systems from a distance. Compare this with passive gathering, which includes such measures
as intercepting broadcasted communications.
26. This list is suggested by Col Phillip A. Johnson. See Johnson, supra note 18. Another
more comprehensive list proposes that offensive defense operations could include:
"psychological operations, military deception, jamming of enemy information systems, signal
intelligence (SIGINT), and attacks on enemy information systems by physical destruction or by
GENERAL,
HEADQUARTERS
UNITED
electronic means." OFFICE OF THE JUDGEADVOCATE
STATE~AIRFORCE,P~ERONLEGALISSUESININFORMATIONOPERATIONS
13-14(3d ed., draft,
Oct. 1997) [hereinafter PRIMER].Note that both lists come from the USAF indicating an everchanging reality.
27. For a more complete discussion of the war powers, see Louis Henkin, The Use of
Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in LOUIS HENKINET AL,RIGHT V. MIGHT:INTERNATIONALLAW
ANDTHEUSEOFFORCE
37-69 (2d ed. 1991). For operations conducted by intelligenceservices,
see ROY GODSON,DIRTY TRICKS OR TRUMP CARDS: U.S. COVERTACTION AND
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
(1995); W. MICHAELREISMAN& JAMESE. BAKER,REGULATING
S,
AND POLICIES OF COVERT
COERCION
ABROADIN
COVERTA ~ o N P: R A ~ C E CONTEXTS,
INTERNATIONALAND
AMERICANLAW
(1992); Robert F. Turner, Coercive CourtAction and the
Law Regulating Covert Action, 20 YALEJ. INT'LL. 427 (1995) (book review).
28. For more in this volume on this concept and its legal implications, see Michael N.
Schmitt, Computer Network Attach and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on
885 (1999).
a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'LL.
29. National Security Act of 1947,50 U.S.C. $0 403,413 (1982); Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961 3 662,22 U.S.C. 5 2422 (1988).

Heinonline r - 3 7 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 9 4 6 1 9 9 8 - 1 9 9 9

19991

DISCRIMINATION IN INFORMATION WARFARE

947

covered by a report from the President to the Congress under
the War Powers Resolution (87 Stat. 855)) may conduct any
special activity unless the President determines that another
agency is more likely to achieve a particular ~bjective.~'
Michael Reisman and James Baker conclude that the "unless" clause
"effectively leaves the matter up to the Pre~ident."~~
As with the more traditional forms of covert action, particular IW
operations are constrained by LOAC as well as the requirement for
executive auth~rization.~~
As with all operations, the choice of tool or
weapon is critical for the legality of the operation. While the effects of
many of these operations could be achieved with conventional arms, this
Note concentrates on those undertaken via the electronic
telecommunications media. Dropping an explosive on a computer
server or a hydroelectric dam, using a laser to destroy a telephone line,
or using a directed electro-magnetic pulse (EMP) to disrupt a satellite's
operations have enough similarity to conventional warfare that the
traditional LOAC would still apply. While not simple, these scenarios
do not present new categories of challenges like the type under analysis
here. This Note concentrates on information attacks, those that seek to
without visibly changing the physical entity within
alter Lcinformation
which it arises."33 Rather than explosives, lasers, or directed EMP's, it

'

30. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 1.8(e), 46 Fed. Reg. 59941 (1981) (emphasis added).
Section l.ll(c) also provides that the secretary of defense shall "[c]onduct programs and
missions necessary to fulfill national, departmental, and tactical foreign intelligence
requirements."
& BAKER,supra note 27, at 119. At the time of publication, Baker was an
31. REISMAN
Attorney Advisor in the Office of Legal Counsel, Department of State. He should not be
confused with then Secretary of State James A. Baker 111.
32. Theserestraintsnow include, most famously and substantively,a ban on assassination.
This ban presents an irony by barring excessive discrimination. President Gerald Ford issued
an executive order to ban U.S. intelligence officers from "engag[ing] in, or conspir[ing] to
engage in, political assassination." United States Foreign Intelligence Activities, Exec. Order
No. 11,905, $5(g), 41 Fed. Reg. 7,733 (1976). President Jimmy Carter issued Executive Order
No. 12,036,s 2-305,43 Fed. Reg. 3687 (1978); and President Ronald Reagan issued Executive
SILENT
Order No. 12,333, $ 2.11, 48 Fed. Reg. 59,947 (1981). See ABRAMN. SHULSKY,
WARFARE:
UNDERSTANDINGTHEWORU)OFINTELLIGENCE 100-101 (Gary J. Schmitt ed., 2d ed.
1993).
&BAKER,supra note 27, at 71; Robert
The debate, however, is not over. See REISMAN
POST,Oct.
F. Turner, Commentary & Opinion, Killing Saddam: Would it Be A Crime?, WASH.
7,1990, at Dl; Lt. Cmdr. Bmce A. Ross, The Casefor Targeting Leadership in War,46 NAVAL
WARC. REV. 73 (Winter 1993); George Stephanopoulos, Why We Should Kill Saddam,
NEWSWEEK,
Dec. 1, 1997, at 34. Turner, Ross, and Stephanopoulos argue that the ban forces
the U.S. to invade a country like Panama (or potentially Iraq) at great risk and cost rather than
effecting a more efficient solution.
33. PRIMER,supra note 26, at 14.
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analyzes the use of such weapons as electronic viruses, worms, and
logic bombs. They can be inserted remotely via various media of
electronic communications: telephone, radio, or Internet. Alternatively,
like a clipper chip, they can be embedded in the software of electronic
machinery manufactured in the United States and sold abroad.34 Then
they could be triggered remotely by telephone, radio, or other electronic
means. These weapons might also be used against the United States, its
resources, people, or infrastructure.
If a non-U.S. party (whether state, group, or individual) assaults or
attempts to assault a U.S. information system, numerous possible
responses exist. As with other armed conflict, defensive IWoperations
are subject to the restraints of LOAC and its principle of proportionality.
The traditional laws of armed conflict provide a starting point for the
application of proportionality. Any U.S. response to an attack should
be intended to have an effect of inflicting roughly the same scale of
harm as was intended in the initial assault. Under general LOAC
principles, the defender should attempt to focus the retaliation against
only the source of the initial assault (or attempt). Application of this
general rule is relatively simple when air defense interceptors or
missiles simply shoot down intruder reconnaissance planes after a failed
attempt to warn them off. The defender does not destroy the intruder's
air force. It is equally straightforward when anavy destroyerreturns fire
and sinks an attacking gunboat but not its entire, far-off fleet. IW
complicates the equation, because the attacker may not be a single,
readily identified individual.
In a conventional assault, the defender knows precisely who is
attacking, e.g., the reconnaissance plane or the gunboat. He may not
know its nationality, but he will usually know which people are directly
engaged in the assault. In IW,an assault will likely be camouflaged.
The assailant will probably route her assault through an innocent
intermediary telecommunications systems. For example, a hacker
would first route her communications through various servers around
the world before attempting to gain access to a DOD computer system.
In such a situation, too hasty a defender might destroy the innocent
intermediate system(s) in his effort to thwart and punish the attacker.

34. A clipper chip is the proposed electronic processor that would allow authorized keyholders to decrypt an encrypted transmission, one in which mathematical algorithms are used
to "scramble data to protect its confidentiality." Scott Charney & Kent Alexander, Computer
Crime,45 EMORYL. J. 931,957 n.27 (1996). In theory the chip could be added to a machine
built almost anywhere by anyone, but it would likely be simpler to add to machines
manufactured in the United States.
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A second major distinction between IW and conventional warfare
is that in a conventional assault, the gravity of the threat is relatively
unambiguous. Thus, we know that areconnaissance plane could collect
sensitive information and that a gunboat could sink a cruiser. An
electronic assault, however, might merely amount to the hapless
intrusion of an American teen-age hacker:' for example, or it might be
part of a Hezbollah strategy to degrade CENTCOM s36 command and
control functions in preparation for a coordinated large-scale terrorist
attack upon Israel. In fact, during the months leading up to the Gulf
War, private Dutch hackers actually pillaged DOD computer sites and
subsequently offered information about UN troops' strength,
capabilities, and positions to Iraqi leader^?^ Had Iraqi president
Saddam Hussein availed himself of this information, thousands more
people on both sides might have died.
The DOD7scomputers will be subject to approximately 14,000hack
attacks this year?* Despite the potential gravity of the threat, active
responses must be made carefully-not automatically. An operator
should evaluate the situation, decide if there has indeed been an attack
and what the appropriate response should be. He assures some level of
protection for harmless trespassers (children or those entering by
mistake). "Any decision to use active defense system ought to be based,
among other factors, on available information about the intruder's skill,
status, and apparent intention^."^^ These active defense systems can
destroy the computers or systems used to launch the assault, or they may
7

35. Some American teenagers pose relatively serious threats, but they are subject to
criminal law and retain constitutional protections. See, e.g., United States v. Moms, 928 F.2d
504 (2d Cir. 1991) (young American hacker inserted a worm-a self-contained computer
program-into various computers via the Internet that crippled 6,200 computers and caused
nearly 100 million dollars in damage). Alternatively, an apparently harmless hacker might be
in the employ of an unfriendly foreign intelligence service and capable of inflicting serious
EGG (1989) (young German in employ of KGB
harm. See CUFFoRD STOLL,THE CUCKOO'S
hacked into US defense-related computers). See also Charney & Alexander, supra note 34, at
931; M.E. Bowman, Is International Law Readyfor the Information Age?, 19 FORDHAMINT'L
L.J. 1935 (1996) (author as Associate General Counsel of theFBI is concerned with attacks on
National Information Infrastructure (NII)). Naturally, the gravity of a conventional threat can
also be miscalculated, as when Korean Air Lines 007 entered Soviet air space.
36. CENTCOM is the unified operational command responsible for^.^. military forces
in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean basin.
37. See Graeme Browning, Hack Attacks, GoV'T EXECUTNE
23 (Aug. 1997).
38. See Schmitt, supra note 28, at 893 & nn.25-26. As a test of 9,000 DOD computer
networks, the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) hacked into and took control of 88
percent of the networks. Only 4 percent of systems operators recognized that they had lost
control and only 0.2 percent reported the events. See Greg Rattray, The Emerging Global
Information Infrastructure and National Security, 21-FALLFLETCHERF. WORLD AFF. 83-84.
See also John Elvin, Insight, WASH.m E S , Mar. 23, 1998, at 32.
39. PRIMER,supra note 26, at 8.
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go further and destroy the assailant's infrastructure, e.g., the power and
telecommunications grids in her city. Removing the human being from
this decision (ie., leaving it to a computer's automated response
mechanisms) would likely result in faster but less responsible decisions.
International law traditionally distinguishes between retorsion and
reprisal-avaluable distinction that should be retained in the context of
information operations. Retorsion consists of an unfriendly but legal act
of force undertaken with retaliatory or coercive p~rpose.~"
Reprisals are
more complicated. They involve acts that are illegal unless they follow
three steps. First, there must be an illegal act by another state. Second,
the state intending to effect the reprisal must give the original assailant
the opportunity to "make right their international wrong."41 Finally, if
this demand goes unsatisfied, then the attacked party may respond in a
manner proportional to the original atta~k.4~
In the context of IW, the decision to adopt a policy of retorsion or
reprisal presents serious but not necessarily fatal evidence problem^?^
The likelihood of a camouflaged assault means that the responding party
has no reasonable expectation that he will be punishing the perpetrator,
unless he can first trace the assault back to a suspect nation, group, or
individual. He might limit these forceful responses to those occasions
when he does trace the assault back to groups or actors already
suspected of being terrorists. Even then, he may only know that he has
traced the attack back to a suspect group. He will likely not know for
sure that he has identified the true assailant. So, he must proceed with
caution. On-screen warnings are important to put intruders on effective
notice, although they may be ineffective when intruders gain access
through back doors, i.e., bypassing entry procedures and access
protocols available to legitimate Internet traffi~.~"
Moreover, reliance
40. See Richard B. Lillich, Forcible Self-Help Under International Law, in NATIONAL
S E C U ~ L A131,132-33
W
(John Norton Moore et al. eds., 1990). See also LOUIS HENKINET
K , INTERNATIONALLAW:
CASESAND MATERIALS
579 (3d ed. 1993) ("Retorsion is often an
'equivalent' act of retaliation in response to an unfriendly act.").
41. Lillich, supra note 40, at 133.
42. See id.
43. Moreover, a vast literature debates whether the U.N. Charter bans retorsion and
reprisals as impermissibleuses of force. See U.N. CHARTER
art. 2(4). Lillich summarizes the
debate. See Lillich, supra note 40, at 133-36. As long as the response is limited to non-forceful
measures such as using computer code to neutralize the offending machinery, this issue should
be avoidable. Lillich concludes the discussion by summarizing a speech by Professor Myres
McDougal on how to read Article 2(4), "in the absence of collective machinery to protect
people against attack and deprivation . . . the principle of major purposes requires an
interpretation which would honor self-help against a prior unlawfulness." Id. at 136.
44. See PRIMER,supra note 26, at 8. An intruder might enter through a "trap door" of his
own creation. He could gain initial entry through aTrojan Horse-aprogram which on its face
has a legitimate purpose but has a hidden, illicit purpose. Note the term's origins in a ruse of
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upon on-screen warnings could result in an attack upon the innocent
intermediary. Given these problems, retorsion should be limited to
shutting down (either temporarily or permanently) the computer system
believed to be generating the original attack. Retorsion would not
extend to destroying the power and telecommunications grids in the city
of the suspected assailant. This would probably exceed the limits of
action deemed defensive defense.
Much like retorsion, strictly defensive operations like computer
security (COMPUSEC) also apply to both military and non-military
systems. Stock exchanges, corporations, travel and communication
systems, and educational institutions all rely on the integrity and smooth
running of their own information systems, much as the military does,
although the failure would rarely be a matter of life and death. Security
measures include virus checks, fire-walls, passwords, or simply locking
the building's front door. U.S. domestic losses to hack attacks were
estimated at $100,000,000 in 1995?' Estimates for computer fraud of
all varieties in the United States run to ten billion dollars a yearP6
Strictly defensive measures must always be applied when protecting
critical infrastructure. If not, the society risks losing use of its military,
transportation, communications, or other instrumentalities vital to its
continued security and well-being.
In terms of national security, infrastructure is both military and
civilian. "Infrastructure is the framework of interdependent networks
and systems comprising identifiable industries, institutions, and
distribution capabilities that provide a continuous flow of goods and
services essential to the defense and economic security of the United
States, the smooth functioning of government at all levels, and society
as a whole."47 Furthermore "[clertain national infrastructures are so
vital that their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitatingimpact
on the defense or economic security of the United States."48 These
include telecommunications, electrical power, gas and oil storage and
transportation, banking and finance, transportation, water supply,

war.

45. Browning, supra note 37,at 23.
AT RISK,
46. Charney & Alexander, supra note 34,at 936-37. See NRC, COMPUTERS
supra note 19;Emilio Jaksetic, Computer Security and Government Lawyers, 43 FED.LAW.26
(Jul. 1996).
47. President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP), Overview
Briefing, F-3(June 1997)(visited Mar. 24,1999)~http:llwwwlpccip.govl>.See also Rattray,
supra note 38,at 81. But see Marc D. Goodman, Why the Police Don't Care About Computer
Crime, 10 HARV.J.L. &TECH. 465 (1997).
48. Exec. Order No. 13,010,61Fed. Reg. 138 (1996).
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emergency services and government service^.^' Protecting them is vital
to the well-being of the nation.
Myriad federal laws and enforcement systems support and
encourage a strictly defensive defense. Foremost among these laws are
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and the Wiretap Act, each of which
defines felonies and misdemeanor^?^ U.S. law against hacking is
broad-ranging and appears comprehensive. Section 1029 of Title 18
generally prohibits fraud and related activity with telecommunications
access devices. The Computer Fraud and Abuse ~ c t "is the main
hacker law, enumerating the types of computer espionage. The act
prohibits unauthorized access to computer-based financial records,
unauthorized access to nonpublic computers of a department or agency
of the United States, unauthorized access to a computer with intent to
defraud, criminal trespass that results in damage, and trafficking in a
password. The Wiretap Act makes it unlawful for "any person" to
intentionally intercept, use, or disclose or endeavor to intercept, use, or
disclose any wire, oral, or electronic communi~ation.~~
The Wiretap Act
is subject to several exceptions, most importantly for systems
ad~ninistrators;~with consent of a party to the comm~nication;~
or if
intercepted under a court order?'
The agencies charged with
enforcement responsibility are criminal investigative units of the
military services, the intelligence community, and the
Aside from
tightening some loopholes, these laws do not appear to need any
significant modifications at this point-at least insofar as they seek to
protect U.S. infrastructure from IW attacks. In stark contrast,
internationallaw is vague and has considerable room for improvement.

49. see id.
50. For these citations, the author is indebted to Major Stanley R. Smith's briefing on
hacker law, before the Legal Aspects of Information Warfare Symposium, Air Force Judge
Advocate General School, Maxwell AFB, Alabama (Nov. 1-3, 1995). For a more complete
listing of relevant U.S. law, SCIENCE APPLICATIONS
INTERNATIONALCORPORATION
(SAIC)
AND NETWORKING
SYSTEMS
OPERATION,
INFORMATION
WARFARE:
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
LEGAL,REGULATORY,
POLICY
AND ORGANIZATIONAL
CONSIDERATIONS
FOR ASSURANCE,
app.
B (1995) (United States Code: Annotated Bibliography and Index). Table 2-2-1 of this report
enumerates the various state computer crime statutes.
51. 18 U.S.C. $ 1030 (1998).
52. 18 U.S.C. $ 2511 (1998).
53. See 18 U.S.C. $2511(2)(a)(i).
54. See 18 U.S.C. $ 2511(2)(c).
55. See 18 U.S.C. $ 2511(2)(a)(ii).
56. See SAIC, supra note 49, tbl. 2-2-2 (indicating the variousjurisdictions for computer
crimes that occur in this country). When an intruder penetrates a Federal system in the U.S.
with criminal intent, the act falls under the jurisdiction of the FBI and the U.S. Secret Service.
When the intruder's intent is espionage, then the FBI shares jurisdiction with the National
Security Agency. See id.
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Despite the challenges in applying it, discrimination between
military and civilian targets remains imperative in the age of
IW-notwithstanding the new difficulties of distinguishing legitimate
targets within the critical infrastructure. The Geneva Conventions of
1949 memorialized the basic ground rules for warfare.57 The 1977
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions established the "Basic Rule" on
discriminationwhich remains valid, if somewhat more difficult to apply
to the facts of IW. "In order to ensure respect for and protection of the
civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall
at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants
and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly
shall direct their operations only against military objective^."^^ Article

57. "In view of the large number of states parties to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the
status which the Conventions have acquired in the international community, it is reasonable to
assume that the Conventions are (at least in large part) declaratory of customary international
law." Roberts & Guelff, supra note 6, at 170.
The 1949 Geneva Conventions are comprised of: (1) Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in theField, opened
for signature Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 31 14,75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention
I]; (2) Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, opened for signature Aug. 12,1949,6 U.S.T.
3217,75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention 111; (3) Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75
U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention 1111; (4) Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T.
3516.75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV].
See also Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, G.A. Res. 2444, U.N.
G.A.O.R., 23rd Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 50, U.N. Doc. A17218 (1968) (affirming these general
principles: (a) that the right of the parties to a conflict to adopt means of injuring the enemy is
not unlimited; (b) that it is prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian populations as such;
and (c) that distinction must be made at all times between persons taking part in the hostilities
and members of the civilian population to the effect that the latter be spared as much as
possible). General Assembly resolutions are recommendations that can become law when
accepted by the international community. See THE LAWSOF WAR: A COMPREHENSIVE
COUE~ONOFP~A
DOCUMENTS
RY
ONINTERNATIONALLAWS
GOVERNING
ARMEDCONFLICT,
at xxii (Michael Reisman & Chris T. Antoniou eds., 1994).
58. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), opened for signature
Dec. 12, 1977, art. 48., 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (1979) [hereinafter Protocol I]. "Although the U.S.
military takes the position that an attacker should accept some responsibility to minimize
collateral civilian casualties," the United States has not ratified Protocol I because it shifts the
burden to segregate civilians from military objectives to the attacker from its traditional
situation where the defender carried this obligation. Danielle L. Infeld, Note, Precision-guided
Munitions Demonstrated Their Pinpoint Accuracy in Desert Storm; but Is a Country Obligated
to Use Precision Technology to Minimize Collateral Civilian Injury and Damage?, 26 GEO.
WASH.J. INT'LL.& ECON.109,123 (1992).
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5 1 protects civilian populations, and 5 l(4) defines unlawfully
indiscriminate attacks as:
(a) those which are not directed at a specific military objective;
(b) those which employ a method or means of combat which
cannot be directed at a specific military objective; or (c) those
which employ a method or means of combat the effects of
which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol; and
consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike
military objectives and civilians without distincti~n.~~
Even read within the context of Protocol 1's Part IV on Civilian
Population, this may appear to be self-reflective or even meaningless
protection, but it has been given flesh. As the International Court of
Justice6' recently held, this regime does not by itself preclude operations
that have a secondary or collateral impact on civilians as long as the
intended target is an armed force or other military ~bjective.~'
The Protocol's Article 43 expands on the basic rule.
The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized
armed forces, groups and units which are under a command
responsible to that Party for the conduct of its subordinates,
even if that Party is represented by a government or an authority
not recognized by an adverse Party.62
These are the parties for whom the prohibitions apply, prohibiting them
from using force to harm nonmilitary objectives and acknowledging
them as legitimate targets for lawful attacks. Article 52(2) then defines
military objectives as those objects "which by their nature, location,
purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and
whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the

59. Protocol I, supra note 58,art. 51.
60. 'The International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague has long had certain limited
roles in respect of implementation of the laws of war. . . [but its] statute, with its built-in
limitations on what types of cases may be brought to it and by whom, is likely to mean that it
only will have to look at a minority of issues concerning the laws of war." Adam Roberts, The
Laws of War: Problems of Implementation in Contemporary Conflicts, 6 DUKEJ. COMP.&
INT'LL. 1 l,43 (1995).
61. See Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 35
LL.M. 809 (I.C.J. 1996).
62. Protocol I, supra note 58,art. 43.
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circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military ad~antage."~~
These legal definitions, however, only lead to consideration of the
questions, not the answers. Distinguishing legitimate targets still
requires a context with which to test the facts.
The traditional tools for distinguishing civilian from military
personnel or operators are not as readily available as they were before
the advent of long-range bombardment and telecommunication^.^^
During the three centuries between 1648 and 1945, combatants
generally wore uniforms that visibly distinguished them from
noncombatants before the engagement.65 Likewise, most warfare
involved physical proximity. Whether using edge weapons or
projectiles, most combatants could see each other and distinguish
combatants from noncombatants. The major exception here is aerial
bombardment by airplane or missile. Even then, those soldiers doing
the targeting still bore the burden of making realistic distinctions-an
obligation unfortunately honored only in the breach.66
Whether they are wearing military uniforms or not is
inconsequential when the parties cannot see each other. The person
launching a computer virus to attack an American military
communications system, for example, might be sitting in the basement
63. Id. art. 52(2). The definition is emphasized by the U.S. Navy. See U N ~ ESTATES,
D
OFTHENAVY,OFFICE OFTHE CHIEFOFNAVALOPERATIONS,
THE COMMANDER'S
DEPARTMENT
HANDB~~K~NTHELAW~FNAVALOPERATIONS,
NWP 9, 'j[ 8.1.1 (Supp. July 1987) [hereinafter
cited in Roberts & Guelff, supra note 6, at 5 n.11.
COMMANDER'S
HANDBOOK],
64. Distinguishing civilians from military personnel has traditionally been a matter of
recognizing the military professionalism which has organized the officer corps of the western
SOLDIER
ANDTHE STATE
powers since the early nineteenth century. See SAMUELHUNTINGTON,
(1957). Still, uniformed soldiers fighting others organized into particular standing units that
had trained and been armed together goes back to at least the end of thel'hirty Years War, when
rulers and people alike recoiled from the horror of unbridled warfare where distinctions between
combatants and noncombatants had disintegrated. See Michael Howard, Constraints on
Warfare, in LAWSOF WAR,supra note 4, at 4 ('The nightmare days of the Thirty Years War
when troops, themselves desperate and starving, tortured, slaughtered, and burned their way
across Europe were not prolonged into the following century."). See also Howard's classic,
MICHAEL
HOWARD,
WARINEUROPEAN
HISTORYch. 2 (1976).
65. Technically this has been true only for professional or conscription armies. The
combatants of the colonized world (Le., the indigenous peoples of the Americas, Africa, Asia
and the Pacific) did not usually wear recognizable uniforms. This cultural difference between
the imperial powers and the colonized wo;ld only fed the cultural, religious, geo-political, and
economic forces that undermined the constraints on warfare whin it was between cultures. That
is to say, the restraints on the western way of war usually did not apply in conflicts between
Western Europeans and the rest of the world. See Howard, supra note 64, at 5,8.
66. See Tami Davis Biddle, Air Power, in LAWSOFWAR,supra note 4, at 152-54; David
Alan Rosenberg, Nuclear War Planning, in LAWSOF WAR, supra note 4, at 165-66. See
generally W. Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 A.F. L. REV. 1, 89-168 (1990).
During the inter-war period, the 1923 Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare "were regarded as an
authoritative attempt to clarify and formulate rules of air warfare. ..."Roberts & Guelff, supra
note 6, at 121.
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of a publicly traded telephone company wearing a nun's habit. Instead
of a military uniform, she would be wearing the symbol of clergy-a
protected group, and she would be sitting in a privately owned building
also doubly protected by being private and vital to the well-being of
society. Even assuming she is indeed a nun and not an impostor, she
would nonetheless also be a combatant subject to a proportional
response, such as the destruction of her own computer or the local area
network. In IW, there is no physical proximity to permit distinguishing
combatants from non-combatants visually. Moreover, in IW, she would
be a combatant and subject to proportional response. In fact, if the
target of her attack did not have the means to respond with his own IW
measures, he could reasonably bomb the building in which she is
believed to be sitting-again a proportional response but one that
returns kinetic destruction for that created by electronic
communications.
Despite these differences, three traditional principles remain
valuable for discriminating between legitimate and illegitimate targets:
military necessity, humanity, and chivalry.
Under customary
internationallaw, military planners must balance all three.67Under U.S.
law, military officers must be taught to grapple with these issues.68
These three principles are also used for determining proportionality and
are, thus, critical for the legitimate undertaking of IW.
First, the principle of military necessity demands that "[olnly that
degree and kind of force, not otherwise prohibited by the law of arrned
conflict, required for the partial or complete submission of the enemy
with a minimum expenditure of time, life, and physical resources may
be applied."69Moreover, military necessity is an especially complicated

67. "Customary law is found in the practice of states, how many is not precisely stated, .

..which is binding upon all persons of international law irrespective of treaty commitments."

HILAIREMCCOUBREY,
INTERNATIONAL
H U M A N ~LAW:
T ~ THEREGULATION
OF ARMED
CONFLICTS
192 (1990). The United States is bound by customary international law. See
RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS
LAWOF THE UNITEDSTATES$ 102 (1987);
Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV.1555 (1984).
68. U.S. Dep't of Defense, DOD Law of War Program, DOD Directive 5100.77 (1979).
See also Almond, The Teaching and Dissemination of the Geneva Conventions and
International Humanitarian Law in the United States, 31 AM. U . L. REV. 981 (1982).
Nonetheless, when I served on the faculty of the United States Air War College in 1995-1996,
fulfillment of this requirement seemed to havelapsed from the core cumculum. When I pointed
this out, a leading JAG lawyer was brought in for a mandatory lecture. Apparently, since my
departure, the War College has allowed this program to lapse again.
69. COMMANDER'S
HANDBOOK,
supra note 63. See also OFFICEOFTHEJUDGEADVOCATE
SUPPLEMENT
TO THE COMMANDER'S
HANDBOOK
GENERAL,
DEP'TOFTHE NAVY,ANNOTATED
ON THE LAWOF NAVALOPERATIONS15.2 (1989), cited in WALTERGARYSHARP,SR.,
CYBERSPACE
AND THE USEOFFORCE:
INFORMATION OPERATIONS, THE LAWSOF WARAND THE
UNITEDSTATESSTANDING
RULESOF ENGAGEMENT,
at L-13 (1987).
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argument in an era of one superpower. The United States has at its
disposal a vastly greater variety of military and political tools than any
other state, past or present. For the United States, therefore, military
necessity often cannot mean that an act is strictly necessary. For the
foreseeable future at least, there will almost always exist alternatives
that could not reasonably be measured against each other (i.e.,
conventional or information operations, economic or diplomatic
sanctions, etc.). Moreover, only one state could plausibly threaten the
existence of the United States. Notwithstanding the fact that the U.S.
has a variety of options in most scenarios, questions of military
necessity in IW do not seem different from those involved in deciding
whether to undertake traditional operations. Instead, they focus more on
targets and objectives than means. To this extent, IW does not
substantially alter the decision-making process.
Second, the IW planner or operator must weigh the humanity of his
actions. Unnecessary suffering and destruction of humanity must be
avoided-a principle widely shared and embodied in the Martens
Clause of the 1907 Hague Convention (IV). "[Tlhe inhabitants and the
belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles
of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among
civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the
public con~cience."~~
No mere precatory overture, the Martens Clause
is embodied in an article common to each of the four 1949 Geneva
Conventions. They note that the fact of denouncing the Convention
shall in no way impair the obligations which the Parties to the
conflict shall remain bound to fulfil by virtue of the principles
of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established
among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity and the
dictates of the public con~cience.~~

70. Hague Convention OV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, pmbl. (emphasis added) [hereinafter Hague IV].
71. Geneva Convention I, supra note 57, art. 63; Geneva Convention 11, supra note 57,
art. 62; Geneva Convention In, supra note 57, art. 142; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 57,
art. 158 (emphasis added). This principle was likewise confirmed by the 1977 GenevaProtocol
I, see supra note 58, art. 1; the 1977 Geneva Protocol 11, see Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol 11), openedfor signature Apr. 10,1981, pmbl., 1125 U.N.T.S.609
(1979) [hereinafter Protocol 111; and the 1981 UN Weapons Convention, see Convention on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be
Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, opened for signature
Apr. 10,1981, pmbl, 19 I.L.M. 1523 (1980). See also Roberts & Guelff, supra note 6, at 4 &
n.8.
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The law of humanity also restrains armed conflict in U.S. LOAC?2
As with military necessity, humanity in armed conflict is a relative
value. It might favor an IW operation, for example, when the only
military alternative is dropping a large explosive on or near the same
target. On the other hand, it might halt an information attack that would
disable the computers controlling not only air defense but also civilian
aviation or an automated subway system. Clearly, humanitarian
principles prohibit actsjustified solely by the Sherman-esque logic that
"war is cruelty . . . the crueller it is, the sooner it will be over."73 The
principle of humanity appears to argue in favor of applying information
operations if the alternatives threaten greater physical destruction and
loss of life.
Third, IW planners and operators remain bound by the enduring, if
amorphous, principles of chivalry. In many societies this might mean
distinguishing between male and female targets, despite the various
treaties and national laws banning distinctions based on sex alone.74
Leaving aside distinctions based on sex, chivalry still protects the
young, old, and helpless even beyond the consideration given all
noncombatants. Chivalry also bans treachery or perfidy. The 1977
Geneva Protocol I bans "[alcts inviting the confidence of an adversary
to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord,
protection under the rules of international law applicable in armed
conflict, with intent to betray that confidence . . . .''75 Perfidy includes:
1)feigning of intent to negotiate or surrender, 2) feigningincapacitation,
3) feigning civilian, noncombatant status, and 4) feigning protected
status by use of signs or uniforms of the UN or neutral states. On the
other hand, ruse of war is not prohibited, which requires drawing yet

72. See COMMANDER'S
HANDBOOK,
supra note 63,952; AIR FORCE JUDGEADVOCATE
GENERAL
SCHOOL, MILITARYCOMMANDER
AND THE LAW580 (1994).
HATHAWAY
& ARCHER
JONES,HOW THE NORTHWON548 (1983). While
73. HERMAN
U.S. Civil War general William T. Sherman is renowned for having made a military strategy of
this notion, he is far from alone in history. See, e.g., Harold Selesky, Colonial America, in
LAWSOFWAR,supra note4, at 61 (the British conquerors of Ireland justified their atrocities as
expedient); Biddle, supra note 66, at 147 & n.23-24,29,34,36 (strategic air power theorists
believed that bombing civilians would destabilize the enemy society and economy, eventually
toppling the state). Even the vaunted Lieber Code includes a strand of this now-outlawed logic.
SeeLieber Code, supra note 12, art. XXXIX ('The more vigorously wars are pursued, the better
it is for humanity. Sharp wars are brief.").
74. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16,1966, art. 2.1,
999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, art. 2.2., 993 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, G.A. Res. 180 (XXXIV), (1979), 19 I.L.M. 33 (1980).
75. Protocol I, supra note 58, art. 37. For the obligations of chivalry, see also
COMMANDER'S
HANDBOOK,
supra note 63, ¶ 5.1.
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another fine distinction under sometimes urgent circumstance^.^^
Legitimate ruses include camouflage, decoys, mock operations, and
misinformation.
In a contemporary conflict, application of these chivalric principles
may seem daunting. However, the differences now are more about
cultural change than about the employment of particular weapons
systems. Military strategist Edward Luttwak believes chivalry is no
longer relevant because it is an atavistic throw-back to a more romantic
era of warfare.77 Yet, while chivalry may seem archaic today, it retains
some normative value. While neither courts nor legislatures have
spoken on this issue, analogy strongly weighs against sending a logic
bomb disguised as e-mail from the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) or even from "Microsoft SoftwareSupport"-where such
a message might be permissible without perfidious label^?^ Using
ICRC and Microsoft tags would constitute an illegitimate act of perfidy,
much as would disguising any dangerous military intruder in the form
of an innocuous invitee. Chivalry does not, however, appear to ban
many other types of clandestine entry into an opponent's system, for
instance, through trap doors, or by camouflaged instructions from an
ally.
In many instances, chivalry may not weigh heavily in the decision
over whether to undertake IW, if only because the penalty for
underestimating chivalry is not likely to be applied unless the
perpetrator loses the war and the evidence and forum exist to convict her
of a war crime. It is difficult to imagine a realistic penalty for the
espionage-like offense of gaining access to a computer by pretending to
be one of the penetrated party's own military personnel. Traditionally
a spy may be executed if local law
but if she returns home,
then she is safe from prosecution for espionage.80 In IW,spying may

76. See Protocol I, supra note 58, art. 37 $5 1-2; Hague IV, supra note 70, art. 24. See
also AIRFORCE
JUDGE
ADVOCATE
GENERAL SCHOOL,supra note 72, at 581.
77. See Edward N . Luttwak, Toward Post-Heroic War$are, FOREIGN
AFE (MayIJune
1995).
,
note 26, at 17-18;
78. See Protocol I, supra note 58, art. 38; see also P ~ E Rsupra
J.
Richard Aldrich, The International Legal Implications of Information War$are,AIRPOWER
108 (Fall 1996). A logic bomb functions like a virus that could selectively degrade or even
destroy the computer hosting it.
79. Hague IV, supra note 70, art. 29 states: "A person can only be considered a spy when,
acting clandestinely or on false pretenses, he obtains or endeavours to obtain information in the
zone of operations of a belligerent, with the intention of communicating it to the hostile party."
Article 30 requires merely that a "spy taken in the acts shall not be punished without previous
trial." The Geneva Convention IV, governing suspected spies in occupied temto~y,merely
requires a fair trial. See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 57, pt. I, art. 5.
80. For similar treatment in time of war, see Hague IV, supra note 70, art. 31.
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occur from the safety of a windowless office in Fort Meade or Shaw
AFEi, headquarters of the National Security Agency and the Air Force's
IW center, respectively. The spy is already home and already safe.
Chivalry, therefore, will play only a minor role in IW.
While it is important to weigh military necessity, humanity, and
chivalry, some categories of outright impermissible activities present
themselves in the area of IW. "The right of belligerents to adopt means
of injuring the enemy is not unlimited."" Nonetheless, the planner may
still balance these three principles to decide whether the targets are
protected by international law. At one extreme are legitimate
targets-military objectives such as army bases, ships of war, weapons
depots, and intelligence headquarters. That is not to say that these may
all be destroyed for any or no reason. The principles of jus ad bellurn,
proportionality, military necessity, chivalry, and humanity continue to
constrain the treatment of enemy combatants and other military
objectives. At the other extreme of the spectrum are those objectives
that are strongly protected by international law, such as religious,
cultural, and medical facilities. Between these per se categories, there
remains a large intermediate area where reasonableness demands
weighing military necessity, humanity, and chivalry as well as
proportionality. As with conventional war planning, info-warriors must
consider the per se categories and also the more questionable targets.
For nearly a century, certain categories of objects have been beyond
the reach of lawful attack. The Hague Convention on Land Warfare
(1907) requires that:

In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps must be taken
to spare, as far as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art,
science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals,
and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided
they are not being used at the time for military purpose^.'^
However, to prevent the rule from being abused to protect otherwise
legitimate targets, the convention further demands segregation. "It is
the duty of the besieged to indicate the presence of such buildings or
places by distinctive and visible signs, which shall be notified to the

81. Id. art. 22.
82. Hague IV, supra note 70, art. 27.
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enemy bef~rehand."'~These specially protected objects include civilian
hospitals, cultural, historical, or religious sites, reservoirs of dangerous
forces (including dams and nuclear power plants), food and other
supplies necessary for human life.'"
During the most recent large-scale international armed conflict, the
Persian Gulf War of 1990-91, Iraq abused these constraints. Among
other transgressions, the Iraqi leadership hid military intelligence
operations beneath children's milk processing plants and placed military
aircraft amidst cultural artifacts." President Saddam Hussein had
constructed dozens of statues of himself that were placed among
otherwise legitimate targets. This left planners with the dilemma of
deciding if the statues were "cultural property" deserving the protection
of the Convention. With each of these acts, Hussein flouted his
obligation as a defender to segregate military from civilian objectives.
In other words, Hussein abused the laws of war, casting the legitimate
activities of the Allies in a light of illegitimacy before the CNN court of
world opinion. In the future, these cynical games may undermine a
state's willingness to risk its own forces in order to adhere to the
principle of discrimination as between legitimate and illegitimate
targets.
Nonetheless, responsible states should continue to try to restore
discrimination and the defender's obligation to segregate. IW may
facilitate this restoration, or at least make it easier. For instance, if
undertaken cautiously, IW may allow a state to disable certain targets
that would be protected from more destructive forms of attack. Thus,
a state actor could possibly attack information systems within protected
sites with an impact that may not rise to the level of destruction that the
conventions prohibit. An IW attack could disable an Iraqi intelligence
center, instead of using 2,000-pound bombs to destroy it and the
children's shelter beneath it. Likewise, destroying a dam is generally
83. Id. Because these provisions failed to protect cultural property in World War 11, a
stronger convention was sought by the international community. The result was the Hague
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May 14,
1954,249U.N.T.S. 240-88[hereinafter 1954Hague Conv.]. The principles it embodies were
most recently affirmed in Protocol I, supra note 58,art. 53 and Geneva Protocol 11, supra note
71,art. 16. This "special protection may be viewed as a part of customary international law."
Roberts & Guelff, supra note 6, at 340.
84. See Hague IV, supra note 70,art. 27; 1954 Hague Conv., supra note 83,at 240. To
receive this protection, however, cultural property must be "situated at an adequate distance
from any large industrial centre or from any important military objective constituting a
vulnerable point . .. [and] are not used for military purposes." Id. art. 8(l)(a)-(b), at 246.
85. Iraq purposefully located legitimate military targets near its civilian population,
CONDUCr OFTHE PERSIAN
civilian objects, and cultural property. See U.S.DEP'TOFDEFENSE,
GULFWAR:FINALREPORTTOCONGRESS
125-26,app. 0,at 0-14(1992);Infeld, supra note 58,
at 137.
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prohibited by Protocol I.86 But temporarily disabling the dam's
electronic control system would not be prohibited if doing so does not
unleash a torrent or deprive civilians of water for the purpose of denying
them sustenance. The Protocol seeks to avoid the horror of unleashing
dangerous forces in a way that would harm civilians. It does not seek
to ban outright the denial of a dam's energy or even of its water to an
enemy. Here IW would be a more flexible and useful tool than
explosives which would likely release the deadly forces--or
permanently deprive the civilians of drinking water.
Likewise, IW might enable an operator to disengage a regional
electric grid temporarily where he would be prohibited from destroying
it. The Hague regime prohibits the "attack or bombardment, by
whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which are
undefended. ..."87 This does not mean that an information warrior can
attack a village's power grid or telecommunications network
intentionally, justified merely by the fact that the grid or network has
some electronic defenses."
However, because the village's
infrastructureis tied into a regional or national network that is defended
by the military, it may be damaged as the collateral effect to an
information strike on a military target. This impact, however, is likely
to be far less serious under an IW attack which puts it out of
commission temporarily, compared to an explosion that would kill
people and cause damage requiring more money, time, and resources to

86. 'Works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear
electrical generating stations, shall not be made the object of attack, even where these objects
are military objectives, if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent
severe losses among the civilian population." Protocol I, supra note 58, art 56(1). TheProtocol
does makelimited exceptions for those works being used "for other than [their] normal function
and in regular, significant and direct support of military operations and if such attack is the only
feasible way to terminate such support. ..." Id. art. 56(2)(a).
Additionally, the Protocol makes it prohibited to "attack, destroy, remove, or render
useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population . . . for the specific
purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population or to the adverse
Party, whatever the motive. ..." Id. art. 54(2).
87. Hague IV, supra note 70, art. 25. See also Hague Draft Rules on Aerial Warfare, arts.
22-26, reprinted in 32 AM.J. INT'LL. 12 (Supp. 1938),Roberts & Guelff, supra note 6, at 121,
126-28.
88. "Customary practice has been that military equipment such as units and bases, and
economic targets such as power sources, industry, transportation, and command and control
centers, are always legitimate targets. This includes transportation and communications
systems. However, 'the inherent nature of an object is not controlling; its value to the enemy
or the perceived value of its destruction is the determinant.' Even traditional civilian objects,
such as private homes, if used for military purposes, may be attacked. The important factor is
to determine if the target makes an effective contribution to the enemy's military operations; if
it does, it is subject to attack, whereverlocated, even if within heavily populated areas." Infeld,
supra note 58, at 122 (citations omitted); see also UNEEDSTATESDEPARTMENT
OFTHE AIR
FORCE,AN INTRODUCI~ON
TO AIR FORCE
TARGETING,
AFP 200-17, at 9 (1989)).
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repair. Thus, IW might permit operations against targets that are
generally protected by international conventions. In doing so, it would
not undermine those agreements but rather would strengthen them by
aligning military means to their desired outcomes.
As noted above, in order to protect civilians and civilian objects, the
defender must not thwart the intent of the principle of discrimination;
he has an obligation to segregate them from military objectives.
Protocol I requires that: "to promote the protection of the civilian
population from the effects of hostilities, combatants are obliged to
distinguish themselves from the civilian population while they are
engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an
attack."89 This obligation is relatively straightfonvard in naval combat
where armed forces move by military vessels alone. At home, however,
states rely on their civilian infrastructure almost entirely to move large
numbers of troops; highways, railroads, and frequently airports are not
duplicated by solely military systems. Moreover, where armed forces
once communicated among themselves-via military media such as
couriers, runners, pigeons, walkie-talkie, or unsecured telegraph or
telephone lines-they
now share the info-sphere with civilians
everywhere. In IW, segregation presents many new challenges.
In the information age, military operations are increasingly reliant
upon advanced communications;information and critical infrastructure
are shared, frequently gutting the defender's reasonable ability to
segregate the military from the civilian.'' Modern military forces rely
on mixed-use telecommunications media, including telephones, faxes,
and e-mail, that travel over the civilian-owned or operated networks.
Even with the unmatched material wealth of the United States, DOD
telecommunications relies heavily on public networks.''
If the
wealthiest nation does not have the resources to segregate its command
and control systems from the civilian communications network, then
one would not expect the remainder of the world to do so.
Deciding whether to destroy civilian communications systems,
therefore, requires careful balancing. However, the scale has never

89. Protocol I, supra note 58, art. 44(3). Recall also Protocol I, article 48's Basic Rule:
"In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the
Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and
combatants ar;d between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct
their operations only against military objectives." (emphasis added to show that the burden falls
both on attacker and defender).
90. 'Warfare is no longer primarily a function of who puts the most capital labor, and
technology on the battlefield, but of who has the best information about the battlefield."
Arquilla & Ronfeldt, supra note 19, at144.
91. This despite the military origins of the ARPANETnnternet.
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clearly materialized. If the measure is lives saved, then IW offers great
possibilities for-expandingthe realm of legitimate targets, because it
enables operators to target systems for quiet disablement rather than
explosive destruction. To this extent, patterns of legitimate usage
should develop as they have for other precision weapons such as laseror GPS-guided munitions. The USAF apparently believes the correct
legal formula for planning should be that the attack must be likely to
produce a military advantage that outweighs the civilian casualties and
damage." This demands weighing the importance of' navigation
systems, communications systems, and electrical grid systems to the
opponent's military effort.93 The balancing process appears to beg the
question of how to value these systems. Does one measure in lives
saved or lost; dollars spared, saved, risked; or only in permanent
physical destruction? IW offers a theoretical opportunity that
conventional weapons do not; degrading a system could be more readily
reversible in ways that physical destruction could not. This means that
lives could be saved while the systems become inoperative, either
permanently or briefly. Does this therefore mean that reversible attacks
will be launched against civilians or civilian infrastructure more freely?
Maybe. Does IWstrengthen adherence to the norms of discrimination?
If the goal is to protect civilian lifestyles as much as possible during the
operation, then the answer is "no." If the aim is to contain war's
destructiveness and to facilitate restoration of civil society after the
conflict, then the answer is "quite probably yes." -

IV.A MODELPROTOCOL
To announce the fact that the laws of war continue to apply, an
international legal convention guiding the conduct of information
operations would be extremely valuable. Rather than creating new
rules, the convention would work best if it codified customary
international law and applied some of the facts to the existing
constraints on warfare.94 Such a protocol might read in relevant part:
92. Writing in an unofficial capacity, Colonel Owen E. Jensen states: "Cut or deny all the
enemy's information-transfer media-telephone, radio frequencies 0,
cable, and other means
of transmission. Sever the nervous system. Deny, disrupt, degade, or destroy every
transmission." Col. Owen E. Jensen, Infonnation Warfare:Principles of Third-Wave War, 8
Arrrpow~
J. 35,37 (Winter 1994). Colonel Jensen is not a lawyer. See also Aldrich, supra
note 78, at 105-09.
supra note 26, at 18.
93. See PRIMER,
94. Among others, Robert and Guelff note that "[t]echnological developments in the
methods of conducting war have increased the extent to which the written law is inadequate or
absent." Roberts & Guelff, supra note 6, at 15.
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1. In deciding whether and how to undertake military
information operations, each Party agrees to balance the
principles of: (a) military necessity; (b) proportionality; and
(c) discrimination. . . .

....
(c) In discriminating between military objectives and
impermissible targets, each Party agrees to balance
humanity, chivalry, and the likelihood that the objectives
could be achieved without physical destruction.
2. Ratification of this convention confersjurisdiction under the
International Criminal Court (ICC) war crimes clause and,
failing that, to ad hoc international or regional courts vested
with appropriate jurisdiction.
The proposal is crafted to circumvent some unstated problems. First,
the proposed protocol would apply only to state parties, in an era when
many transnational aggressors are not states. This makes sense with the
framework of most humanitarian law, which currently applies only to
states. States remain the fundamental units of the international system.
As non-governmental organizations and groups gain political and legal
recognition in the global (i.e., not merely "international") system, then
they, too, could sign and become parties. In that eventuality, this
protocol, like Protocol I, would protect non-state actors as well as state
parties.
Second, the proposed protocol does not contain a definition of an
information operation. Instead of defining "military information
operations," the ICC (or the ad hoc judicial system) could build a body
of case law that would allow for more flexible, fact- and contextsensitive interpretations much as has been done with crimes against
humanity or the ''just following orders" defense?' Because states
voluntarily submit to a court's jurisdiction, they could opt out if the case
law develops unfairly or in a way that they find disagreeable. That
would not, however, halt the creation of new customary international
law and eventuallyjus cogens. Should the day come when people can
agree upon a definition, it could be added by judicial interpretation, in
a dispute or in an advisory opinion.
Third, the model protocol avoids the potential evidentiary problems
in a way that may compel those who undertake information operations
to document their efforts to fight fairly. Such a requirement will
95. See Beth Van Schaack, The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the
J . TRANSNAT'LL.
787 (1999).
Incoherence, 37 COLUM.
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reinforce caution. In addition, computer systems for tracing and
tracking a user's keystrokes are increasingly capable-a trend likely to
continue as long as commercial users can profit from research about
their customers.
Fourth, the principles of humanity and chivalry are very difficult to
judge as between societies of different cultures. This problem is central
to the laws of war in general. However, inter-societal conflict
frequently involves problems of cultural insensitivity; this is not an
argument for abandoning efforts to generate and encourage global
norms constraining conflict.
Finally, like Protocol I, the model protocol does not mention a duty
on the defender to segregate military from non-military objectives.
Acknowledging the insurmountable economic obstacles to creating
redundant military infrastructure, this convention would shift most of
the burden of discrimination to the attacker. This might well result in
hindering the development of IW capabilities-a reasonable outcome.
On the other hand, the court would have the discretion to decide when
the defender unjustly placed its civilians or civilian infrastructure in
harm's way.

Discrimination remains critical to the legitimate use of force in the
information age. LOAC is facing some of its greatest challenges in
keeping up with astounding technological changes. The capacity to
compute, communicate, and store information doubles every year or
two. LOAC faces not only many challenges in the short run but also a
change in the nature of warfare that is more dramatic than any in the
past two millennia. Still, the principles of military necessity, humanity,
and chivalry provide valuable limitations. Diligent, creative, and
intelligent application of these principles should see LOAC well into the
twenty-first century. An IW protocol and resort to the proposed ICC
should help.
Mark R.Shulman*

* A.B. Yale College 1985 (History); M.St Oxford University 1986 (History); C.Phil.
University of Califomia, Berkeley 1989 (History); Ph.D. University of Califomia, Berkeley
1990 (History); J.D. candidate, Columbia University School of Law, 1999. I would like to
thank Jonathan Bush, W. Darrell Phillips, and Matthew Waxman for their thoughtful comments
on previous drafts of this Note.
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APC
ARPANET
CENTCOM
COMPUSEC

c3
CIA
DISA
DOD
EMP
FBI
GA
ICC
ICRC
I.L.M.

Iw
JAG
KGB
LOAC
NRC
NSA
PCCIP

RF
SAlC
SIGINT
U.N.T.S.
USA
USAF
USN
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USAF Air Force Base
Armored Personnel Carrier
DOD7sAdvanced Research Projects Agency-funded progenitor to
the Internet.
Central Command
Computer Security
Command, Control, and Communications
Central Intelligence Agency
DOD Defense Information Systems Agency
Department of Defense
Electro-magnetic pulse (used in this Note to refer to non-nuclear
explosion created EMP)
Federal Bureau of Investigation
United Nations General Assembly
International Criminal Court (proposed)
International Committee of the Red Cross
International Legal Materials, American Society of International
Law
Information Warfare
Judge Advocate General
Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopastnosti (Committee for State
Security, USSR)
Law of Armed Conflict
National Research Council
National Security Agency
President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection
Radio frequencies
Science Applications International Corporation
Signals Intelligence-information derived from intercepting
electromagnetic (radio) waves
United Nations Treaty Series
United States Army
United States Air Force
United States Navy
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APPENDIX
11: TYPES
OF WARFARE
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